

**STRATEGY
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PROJECT**

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**THE PEACE OPERATIONS FROM AN
INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE**

BY

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Peace Operations from an Intelligence Perspective

by

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ABSTRACT

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Military Intelligence (MI) professionals are operating in a dangerous environment—an environment labeled “peace operations.” Peace operations range from benign situations to those of war and can be divided into four major types: observation, traditional peacekeeping, 2nd generation peacekeeping and enforcement. Supporting a commander in each of these subcategories can be similar and very different from more traditional support. Nationally, peace operations require a marriage of national and tactical-level collection and analysis—multi-nationally, a merger of unlike systems and doctrine. Belligerents and allies may be easy or hard to identify. End states change. Sources and customers may be nontraditional. This paper presents and examines the unique considerations of intelligence support to peace operations—operations that will be the dominant form of military operations in the next decade.

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PEACE OPERATIONS FROM AN INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE

America hates war.

America hopes for peace.

Therefore, America engages in the search for peace.

--Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 5 Oct 1937¹

Today's Military Intelligence (MI) professionals are operating in an untrained, unfamiliar, complex and dangerous environment. This environment is not a battle space that defines the boundaries of war and the destruction of an enemy. It is an environment created to observe, maintain, or impose peace on two or more belligerents—an environment that fosters the economic and political development of nations or states—an environment that calms ethnic and religious hatred. This new environment is labeled "peace operations" and President Roosevelt's words describing America's interests as Japan invaded China in 1937 express America's motives in peace operations today. MI professionals are more frequently asked to create and preserve peace rather than conduct war.

Peace operations are not new. The first such mission, the 1948 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) mission to Palestine, continues today.² Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, these operations have dramatically increased in frequency and are now the most likely missions in which our military may participate.³ It is therefore important to

understand the fundamentals and the intelligence environment of peace operations. There are both critical differences and important similarities in the conduct of intelligence in peace operations and in war.

Characteristically, peace operations are a reality of today's strategic environment. They range from benign to deadly along a spectrum of conflict, just as military operations range from benign humanitarian operations to general war. They require intelligence support from every level of collection and analysis, tactical to national. The United Nations (UN) sanctions or establishes legitimacy for peace operations. Belligerents may be easy or hard to recognize and identify. End states and military objectives change as diplomats enjoy success or suffer failure—a process referred to as "mission creep."⁴ Most often, these operations are multinational. It is important for intelligence personnel to understand the phenomenon of peace operations, to know that they differ from the more familiar spectrum of operations, and to understand the considerations for successful intelligence support to peace operations. This paper establishes the reality of peace operations, describes the environment from an intelligence perspective, identifies unique considerations for successful intelligence support to peace operations, and provides examples where appropriate.

Peace Operations: An Intelligence Mission Reality

For the next generation of armed forces personnel, peace operations are a mission reality. Add them to your Mission Essential Task List (METL) no matter what level your organization. In discussing smaller-scale contingencies, of which peace operations is a subset, President Clinton states in his October 1998, National Security Strategy for a New Century:

Smaller-scale contingency operations encompass the full range of military operations short of major theater warfare, including humanitarian assistance, peace operations, enforcing embargoes and no-fly zones, evacuating U.S. citizens, reinforcing key allies, and limited strikes and intervention. These operations will likely pose the most frequent challenge for U.S. forces and cumulatively require significant commitments over time.⁵

Since the demise of the Soviet Union, peace operations have monopolized the resources of the U.S. Operations in Iraq (Desert Shield/Storm), Somalia (Provide Relief, Restore Hope), Haiti (Uphold Democracy), and Bosnia are post-Soviet examples sanctioned by the UN. The U.S. Mission to the UN reports that there were a total of 15 peace operations between 1948 and 1988—the beginning of the end for the Soviet Union—and since 1988, there have been 28 such operations, a two-fold increase in one quarter the time.⁶

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former Secretary General of the UN, recognized that the increase in missions was related to the end

of the cold war as the "New World Order" became more and more characterized by disorder.⁷

It is indisputable that since the end of the cold war there has been a dramatic increase in the United Nations activities related to the maintenance of peace and security. ...The end of the cold war removed constraints that had inhibited conflict in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere.⁸

He continues by characterizing these increasing conflicts as mostly intrastate, religious or ethnic in character, and accompanied by the breakdown of law and order, chaos, and general banditry.⁹ Major General Robert Scales amplifies this train of thought and agrees that conflicts will be numerous and sources intractable.

Reduced influence of a bi-polar strategic balance has already allowed the world to return to its pre-Cold War natural condition. Competing states will seek to gain dominance over their neighbors. Conflicts will abound as some nations redress historic grievances and other open old wounds that have been festering for hundreds of years.¹⁰

Rather than withdraw from a more fractious, multi-polar world, the U.S. chooses to remain actively engaged. A study of President Clinton's national security strategy reveals that the U.S. exerts worldwide leadership to foster the development of democratic values and respect for law and human rights. Countries defined by such principles are more stable and rarely dangerous to neighboring or like-minded states. This leadership comes at a cost, but in the end, is a sound investment in future

national security, reducing the number of maturing situations that would endanger the vital interests of the U.S.¹¹ For this "investment" reason, the U.S. will deploy military forces in situations that are vital to the security of the U.S. Additionally, deploying U.S. military personnel in peripheral or humanitarian operations demonstrates U.S. leadership in shaping a world more tolerant of democratic values. Bosnia is just such an example. The U.S. has involved soldiers in the pursuit of interests less than vital. Combine the U.S. tendency to get involved and the end of Soviet-era stability with the demonstrated increase in the number of peace operations, and the conclusion is clear—peace operations are a mission reality for today's United States armed forces.

The Spectrum of Peace

Analyzing peace operations helps identify a spectrum of peace, increasingly dangerous environments that range from benign to deadly and war-like. This spectrum provides a framework with which to analyze intelligence support requirements and, interestingly, provides a chronology of the changing peace operation's environment. The UN, in its annual update on peacekeeping operations, Blue Helmets, The Strategy of UN Military Operations, categorizes peace operations into four categories: observation missions, traditional peacekeeping,

second-generation peacekeeping and peace enforcement.¹² U.S. military doctrine reminds us that all peace operations are distinct but can generally be categorized as peacekeeping or peace enforcement.¹³

The Spectrum of UN Military Operations




Figure 1. The Spectrum of UN Military Operations¹⁴

The primary distinction is consent. Observation, traditional and second-generation peacekeeping missions are conducted with the consent of the belligerents. Peace enforcement is sanctioned but absent belligerent consent.¹⁵ Belligerents are compelled to comply with "resolutions or

sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order."¹⁶ Peacekeeping is hopefully peaceful and peace enforcement is sanctioned warfare. The danger to peacekeepers increases from the most benign-observer missions, to the most dangerous-peace enforcement missions.

The distinction is useful for intelligence professionals. At first glance, benign conditions intuitively demand less intelligence support-no more than a method to disseminate observations and a low-level human intelligence (HUMINT) system supporting force protection. Just as intuitively, peace enforcement demands the most in intelligence support. Targets must be developed, Battle Damage Assessments (BDA) must be made and resultant effects of enforcement actions must be assessed. However, generalizations like these can be dangerous. The Germans in World War II practiced and suffered from a dangerous generalization, "...while intelligence is integral to the defense, it is only contingent to the offense."¹⁷ While the origin of this assumption is attributed to Clausewitz, this statement was and is dangerously untrue. Such a practice led the Germans to ignore necessary investment in intelligence infrastructure and suffer from poor intelligence during offense and defense. A slightly more rigorous analysis of our intuition is required.

OBSERVATION MISSIONS

Observation missions are composed of lightly armed or unarmed military personnel charged with observing a politically mandated objective with consent of the belligerents. Military forces are carefully selected from neutral and less powerful countries to foster credibility and impartiality with belligerents. Missions include monitoring cease fires, border violations, elections, troop withdrawals, disengagement, demilitarization, demobilization, embargoes, and human rights violations.¹⁸ Observers execute no combat missions and if they find themselves in danger, they defend themselves with minimal force and withdraw. Observation and force protection are the critical missions.

Intelligence implications include the following. Multinational operations are characterized by incompatible collection and dissemination systems and incompatible doctrine at the tactical and operational levels. Collection and dissemination must be combined and centrally managed. Threat warning in near real time from national systems is required as diplomatic agreements may deteriorate and result in the disenfranchised striking quickly and violently against poorly armed peacekeepers. The national link to disseminate threat warning and information concerning the diplomatic climate

suffers from the same incompatibilities as tactical collection and dissemination in multinational peace operations.

TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Traditional peacekeeping missions are characterized by slightly larger military forces from more powerful countries, tasked with missions that include occupying a distinct area of land separating two belligerents. These missions do not include coercion. Soldiers deploy to provide a tangible buffer between two belligerents after an agreement was signed.¹⁹

SECOND-GENERATION PEACEKEEPING

Second-generation peacekeeping is more dangerous in that the belligerents may still be warring and peacekeepers may find themselves among the belligerents rather than safely between them. Peacekeepers may actively engage rogue elements while accomplishing missions such as the delivery of food and supplies. Second generation peacekeepers are normally military forces for first power countries such as the U.S., Britain, France, Canada, Germany, and Russia. They deploy in larger and more traditional military formations. Missions include restoring order, protecting and delivering aid, assisting transitions to democratic forms of government, securing an environment, and disarming factions—the most dangerous.²⁰ The

"enemy" is more difficult to define. The problems of multinational intelligence operations increase. Multinational participants may execute unilateral peace initiatives, as with the unilateral Italian approach to Aideed in Somalia. Understanding and barometrical sampling the political and cultural situations becomes more critical. Force protection efforts increase as dangers becomes tangible. National-level threat information is required. Information operations facilitate diplomatic efforts and serve a force protection mission. Rules of Engagement (ROE) are published based on enemy intentions and capabilities. Diplomatic, interagency, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) personnel, and multinational observers demand intelligence support and operational protection.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT

The most dangerous and analogous to war of any peace operation is peace enforcement. Examples include Korea, the Persian Gulf, UNOSOM II—the hunt for Aideed in the last phase of operations in Somalia, the bombings in Bosnia Herzegovina and now, the punitive bombing of the Serbs related to actions in Kosovo.²¹ Impartiality has vaporized and consent becomes a statement of legitimacy provided by the UN to U.S. and supporting coalitions. These operations have the feel and taste

of war. Intelligence requirements are those with which intelligence professionals are most comfortable—targeting, force and asset protection, battlefield damage assessments, enemy intentions and future activity assessments, current activity summaries, and situational reporting.

In sum, intelligence operations in peace operations require the nation's strategic intelligence assets as well as those deployed operationally and tactically to satisfy the spectrum of intelligence missions. These systems must work together and interface with multinational systems. This marriage of national-to-tactical intelligence collectors, processors, analysts, and disseminators is the most unique feature of intelligence support to peace operations.

A Marriage of National and Tactical

Commanders' interests in peace operations range from the tactical to the strategic. In Bosnia, commanders must master their military missions, such as force protection, and they must also deal with the outcomes and effects of diplomatic decisions made at the strategic-level. They may themselves operate within the theater as diplomats. Every diplomatic decision will have immediate effects at operational and tactical levels. The essence of peace operations is diplomacy—peace operations provide time for diplomatic solutions to be found and

implemented. Whatever the progress or lack thereof, young soldiers at the patrol level will be affected.

The peacekeepers often have to balance an extremely sensitive system where a single shot in the area of operation may acquire a strategic importance and a statement from the White House may cause shots to be fired. The tactical commander must consider more than the situation in his area, such as what is going on at the higher levels (peace negotiations, the international political game at regional and global levels etc), a condition which puts great demands on him and his staff.²²

Intelligence personnel must work requirements from the national to tactical-level to satisfy the commander's diplomatic and military requirements. Orchestrating U.S. tactical to national-level intelligence collection systems is a new and challenging task.

In the U.S. Army's case, doctrine establishes intelligence collection echelons. Doctrine assigns assets to those echelons, establishing certain capabilities at certain levels thought to be appropriate as forces deploy for any mission. Tactical-level organizations have organic collection assets that provide information supporting the targeting of weapons and physical observations. Divisions and corps are supported with their own organic collection systems. The same is true for analysis and production structures. These structures are horizontal and distinct. Dissemination systems, designed to deliver information to every level, provide a vertical bridge between

the collection assets found at tactical, operational and national-levels. However, focusing collection assets from differing levels on the same target simultaneously, is cumbersome and bureaucratic. Similarly, focusing the analysts at national-level on tactical problems is just as difficult.

Replacing these cumbersome focusing techniques with responsive techniques is a new challenge for intelligence personnel supporting peace operations. The best example of this problem is the challenge faced by collection managers.

Collection managers at various levels have control over their organic assets. If they determine the need for capabilities assigned to higher echelons, they make formal requests for support. These requests can take precious time, as they become prisoners of bureaucratic evaluation and approval processes—processes that are different for every intelligence discipline (SIGINT-signals intelligence, HUMINT-human intelligence, IMINT-imagery intelligence). A division-level collection manager does not have the ability to command and control national-level assets even if granted the priority over other standing national requirements. This is a recognized problem and crisis-tasking systems exist. Nonetheless, collection systems at all levels should be compatible and eventually interoperable. Inherent in such design would be the ability to commit and control these collection systems at whatever level appropriate—from the

foxhole to the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) in the Pentagon. Sophisticated connectivity and automation tools must also be developed to effectively marry national to tactical systems and move control to the appropriate level. Eventually, cross-disciplined systems must be developed.

The challenge to focus multilevel intelligence collection on peace operations requirements is made more difficult by including other nations. Imagine the additional degree of difficulty created by integrating intelligence systems owned and operated by multinational forces. Language, compatible information systems, and doctrine are only some of the complicating issues.

Today's answer is linking all levels of collection and analysis with dedicated communications and liaison personnel. Dedicated communications provide a path for critical information to travel from national to tactical-levels and vice versa—a first step in providing much needed flexibility. This connectivity also allows managers and analysts, at all levels, to task collection, exchange and share information and defend assessments and interpretations. The necessity of bridging national-to-tactical organizations and capabilities, created a liaison outfit called the National Intelligence Support Team (NIST). The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA) and

now the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) deploy analysts to the field with direct connectivity to their national-level agencies.²³ These analysts connect the field to nationally held information and provide access to immediate tasking of national-level assets as the situation dictates. "A NIST provides a mission-tailored national intelligence "reach-back" capability to fulfill the stated intelligence requirements of the supported Joint Task Force (JTF)."²⁴ It also allows national-level agencies to disseminate threat-warning information, such as incoming SCUD missiles, in near real time in support of deployed military forces. Lastly, it is not unusual for deployed intelligence organizations to decide that NIST personnel may be more useful employed in other functions and reassign them.

An interesting feature of the NIST support structure is that it provides "reach-forward" just as efficiently as it provides "reach-back". In a general sense, NIST augmentees are loyal to their organizations. They may be tempted to provide their organizations operational information and intelligence using their communications systems. At times, this information travels up echelon more quickly than down. It is possible that the intelligence officer (J2) supporting the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) will receive and pass information to the CJCS more quickly than a JTF Intelligence Support Element (JISE).

passes that same information to the JTF or peace operations commander. Superior commanders now have better visibility into operations in the field and may feel compelled to direct actions at inappropriate and subordinate levels.

NISTs are a start but are not the complete answer for integrating intelligence systems from national-to-tactical. NISTs facilitate communications between national and tactical organizations, helping one level to understand the priorities of the other. Until intelligence systems are engineered and management systems are designed to inter-operate, and until military forces can deploy with appropriate collectors, ignoring organic associations, NISTs must suffice. Any progress made in making national systems more responsive to tactical requirements is welcomed progress.

In a perfect world, the peace operations commander states his requirements, the intelligence officer acknowledges those requirements, faces about, and tasks the entire intelligence system from national-to-tactical and across all participating countries. This entire intelligence system responds directly to the intelligence officer and then he or she faces about and hands the warfighter the information required, in the relevant timeframe, and in the required format.

The Strategic Intelligence Environment in UN Peace Operations

The United Nations does not find itself comfortable with the concept of intelligence.²⁵ For many reasons this is easily understood. In missions where impartiality is critical, where the belligerents have provided operational consent, the collection of information on the belligerents without their knowledge, once exposed, would easily jeopardize the mission. Fundamentally, covert collection, targeting belligerents that have consented to your presence, against their will, seems to violate the principles of the operation. Even so, covert collection may be necessary.

First, force protection requires that all be done to protect your peacekeepers. Environments are no longer benign. Somalia and Bosnia provide examples in which rogue factions, clans, or bandits, with little invested in the peace process, find political advantage in attacking peacekeepers directly. This environment is more the norm without the mitigating influence and strategic counter balance of the Soviet Union.

Secondly, the UN is itself recognizing its need for strategic intelligence information. Boutros-Ghali states in his Agenda for Peace,

(the Secretary General, in) Recognizing the need to strengthen the capacity of the UN for early warning, collection of information and analysis,

1. Encourages the Secretary-General to set up an adequate early-warning mechanism for situations, which are likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace,...

2. Invites the Secretary-General to strengthen the capacity of the Secretariat for the collection of information and analysis to serve better the early-warning needs of the Organization...

3. Invites Member States ... to provide timely early-warning information, on a confidential basis when appropriate to the Secretary General;...²⁶

It is difficult to imagine that the UN could afford to develop, purchase and maintain the national-level collection assets and manage these systems in a day-to-day fashion. Technical collection assets may include space-based platforms, aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These systems are very expensive to acquire and maintain. More likely, the UN will seek to gain access to systems that already exist and are already employed by Member States. Mr. Hugh Smith recognized this concept in his article *Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping* and even suggests that member states may sell access to intelligence systems and information as a way to invest in their own systems.²⁷

Nonetheless, the UN is making preparations to collect, analyze and disseminate information that it may somehow find available through whatever means. The UN has created a Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) led by an Under Secretary General. Within the DPKO, the UN has created two

Assistant SGs, one of whom is responsible for ongoing operations. The operations organization divides the world into three regions, Europe & Latin America, Asia & the Middle East, and Africa.

The UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations




Figure 2. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations.²⁸

A Situation Center was created to collect, process, analyze and disseminate information collected on current operations.²⁹

It works 24 hours per day, seven days per week. Although concerned with current operations, it is a beginning point from which to build a center to deal with the three main functions of strategic intelligence-warning, baseline knowledge of foreign capabilities, plans, and intentions, and knowledge to support government or action³⁰ or knowledge to support efforts in preventative diplomacy.³¹

U.S. support is most frequently provided the U.S. Ambassador to the UN and U.S. Mission staff via Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) connectivity. JWICS connects the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC), J2, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Joint Staff, Pentagon to the U.S. Mission. Requests are made of the J2, JCS by the mission and products satisfying those requests are provide via JWICS.

Another feature of the strategic intelligence environment at the UN is the lack of information security. As there is no intelligence collection apparatus owned and operated by the UN, Members provide intelligence as the UN arranges or as members volunteer services. Additionally, there is no requirement to control and disseminate classified information and, subsequently, there is no control system. Member nations are loyal to their own national interests and will only respect non-disclosure arrangements over which they have sovereign control.

Information, classified or not, once provided the UN, is essentially unclassified. Nations that have spent years collecting secrets concerning another Member County cannot be expected to protect secrets provided the UN by that targeted country. The point is that "sources and methods" can easily be determined from such information. Therefore, a new feature in dissemination is developing—providing classified information to those with no regard for protecting the information.

Information is provided to a very restricted audience, such as the Secretary General only or information is so sanitized prior to release that no collection source is discernable. As most of these operations are combined, the same situation occurs at the operational-level. The sensitivity of member nations over their national intelligence systems will also impact the early stages of the UN's attempt to create collection systems owned and operated by the UN. Mr. Hugh Smith summarizes the fact of information openness as follows.

The fundamental reason for the openness of UN intelligence is the fact that the organisation is international and its personnel are multinational. First, on the political level, states tend to have diverse interests in any peacekeeping operations. Once states acquire information that can promote their own interests, the temptation to exploit this information will be strong. Second, the loyalty of personnel working directly or indirectly for the UN will tend to lie, in the last analysis, with their own country.³²

Defining the Enemy

The concept of "enemy" is important. Collection efforts must be directed against some target set. In the most benign humanitarian operations, the only enemy may be rouge factions or terrorist groups that object to U.S. or UN presence—objections that may result in asymmetric attacks on deployed forces. Force protection requires that these factions are identified and that collection against their activities intensifies, locally and internationally. Because U.S. lives are at issue, covert national-level collection systems will be employed. As George Tenet states,

As Director of Central Intelligence, I will never let a man or woman in uniform deploy to a crisis or conflict without the best information our country can provide. I would never tolerate the loss of a single man or woman because some bureaucrat in Washington wants to have a philosophical debate about requirements.³³

Once national collection is made available, no known U.S. commander would refuse it. The bombings in Khobar, Saudi Arabia and Beirut, Lebanon are still fresh in any U.S. commander's memory. Classified national-tactical intelligence collection must covertly target entities, groups, factions or organizations without their knowledge—without compromising UN credibility or impartiality. Possible terrorist-like entities are the "enemy." As we move from observer to enforcement along the peace operations spectrum, the likelihood of asymmetric action against

peacekeeping forces increases and the possible perpetrators remain an "enemy."

Traditional peacekeepers must observe and verify, and commanders must engage the belligerents diplomatically to secure diplomatic end-states. The freedom to observe is fundamental.³⁴ Passive collection systems designed to visually observe belligerent activity become important; systems such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), aircraft and overhead national systems. The more the commander knows about the activities and intentions of the belligerents, the more successful the commander will be in his diplomatic endeavors. This concept of transparency becomes more important in 2nd generation peacekeeping. The belligerents are now part of the collection set. Those faction leaders invested in chaos, violating human rights, and crime are clearly targeted for collection.

In peace enforcement operations intelligence collection targets those forced to comply with UN end-states and, secondarily, those that may object sympathetically and violently. In missions that begin as humanitarian or traditional peacekeeping and develop into peace enforcement, such as Somalia, the enemy is not so easily defined.

Are allied forces to be targeted? Are they part of the "enemy" collection set? Nations have self-interests and unique cultural perspectives. When overlaid upon ongoing peace

operations, these self-interests and perspectives may have unexpected outcomes. Their effect on unity of effort may be significant. In Somalia, the Italians conducted unilateral negotiations with Aideed while the U.S., convinced of his responsibility for the targeting of peacekeepers, secured UN approval for his arrest. In Bosnia, possible Russian religious and cultural sympathies with the Serbs remain a concern for U.S. peacekeepers. The Russian relationship with the Serbs becomes an increasingly important issue as the U.S. escalates its effort to end Serb aggression against the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo. Peacekeepers must understand the effects of national and cultural interests of multinational forces on peace operations. Multinational forces, allied in peace operations are therefore a constant consideration for inclusion in an "enemy" collection list. During operations, active liaison with coalition partners may be all that is required. Carefully consider adding allied coalition forces to the list of possible "enemy" targets. If covert collection is employed and exposed, the resulting damage to the multinational coalition and the peacekeepers' credibility could be disastrous. On the other hand, being surprised by outcomes related to a coalition partner's unilateral disregard of stated peace operations policy may be equally disastrous.

Unfortunately the concept of enemy is dynamic rather than static. The enemy changes with time. Targets include the belligerents, the attitudes of the local population, the dynamic list of groups motivated to conduct asymmetrical attacks on peacekeepers, and possibly the very countries that make up the multinational peace operations force. As diplomatic efforts progress, stall, or fail, or as the disenfranchised organize, the list increases or decreases. Changes in diplomatic end-state affect the list. Covert collection operations, if discovered, may create an enemy out of a consenting, benign belligerent. In the very least, UN impartiality and credibility will be sacrificed, jeopardizing diplomatic end-states. At times, protecting UN credibility and diplomatic progress is the overriding consideration when defining the enemy. At other times, the security of the deployed force is primary.

Collection Along the "Fault-Line"

Kenneth Allard, in his lessons learned study of Somalia, states that, "although nonintrusive means of collecting information are especially useful for peace operations, human intelligence is usually the key."³⁵ This emphasis on human intelligence (HUMINT) is shared in many peace operations after action documents and, as a result, HUMINT receives a great deal of attention in documents outlining future intelligence

requirements.³⁶ Allard goes on to state, "The most basic intelligence in a low-intensity conflict scenario is invariably provided by humans, the best and most important HUMINT source always being the soldier or marine in the field."³⁷ Allard has it almost right—humans are vital when collecting information on the intentions of a belligerent or enemy—but soldiers and marines are not the only humans in the field. The peace operations area is filled with unusual and allied military and non-military efforts. In addition to normal attempts of co-opting sources with access to belligerent leadership, intelligence personnel must carefully analyze every possible friendly contact with belligerents and exploit that contact as a source of information. The local population must also be studied as there may be some with routine and direct contact with belligerents. Intelligence personnel must then determine points at which friendly contact is made with this subset of the local population.

This analysis may be referred to as fault-line analysis. Collection along this fault-line could prove vital. The possible information source list is a long one and includes: non-governmental organizations (NGOs), humanitarian organizations (HOs, private and UN sponsored), religious organizations, military observers, special forces activities, military doctors and dentists working in the local population,

civil affairs, and diplomatic efforts to develop governmental, judicial and policing infrastructures. In Somalia, there were no less than 30 international humanitarian and six UN humanitarian organizations providing relief and infrastructure development assistance.³⁸

Tapping these lucrative sources of information may prove difficult. NGOs are not generally willing to participate in intelligence collection operations directed against those they are pledged to help. Such participation may not only violate their moral values but also may, if disclosed, endanger their lives.³⁹ UN Military Observers, on the other hand, are tasked with observing violations in negotiated cease fires, troop withdrawals, weapons turn in or cantonment, sanction violations, etc. In the course of their daily missions, observers become an excellent source of information. In either case, communicating the information may prove the challenge.

In every peace operation, intelligence personnel must conduct fault-line analysis. At every point that peace related operations touch the local population, vital information may be gathered. Efforts must be made to develop consistent, periodic, and responsive contact with all possible fault-line sources.

In Somalia, civil, humanitarian and military operations required coordination. Centers developed where information was shared and requirements discussed. One reason was the number of

agencies working in Somalia, "there were at least 49 different international agencies, including UN bodies, NGOs and HROs.⁴⁰ A second reason unique to the Somalia situation was that food and the distribution of food became a source of clan power. Assisting organizations began to require security assistance while distributing, convoying and warehousing food. As a result, peacekeepers in Somalia created a Civil-Military and a Humanitarian Operations Center.

...one of the most important initiatives of the Somalia operations was the establishment of the Civil-Military Operations center (CMOC). ...Liaison officers from the major multinational contingents, together with the U.S. command, used this center as a means of coordinating their activities—such as providing military support for convoys of relief supplies.... These practical duties also lent themselves to the broadening of contacts between military and civilian components.... Equally important, however, was the fact that CMOC was able to work closely with the Humanitarian Operations Center run by the UN—thus allowing a single focal point for all relief agencies operating in country. ...the staff of CMOC was deliberately kept small in order to keep it focused on its mission of coordination and information exchange.⁴¹

Such centers provide an excellent forum for the exchange of information concerning belligerent intentions and activities in areas of operation. Intelligence organizations must invest in liaison personnel to work organizations of this type, sort the kinds of information available in these centers and develop those sources that fill established intelligence requirements. Analyzing and bridging the fault-line between peacekeepers and

the local population is one unique and critical source of valuable information in peace operations, but it is not the only source.

In Bosnia/Herzegovina, some of the best information came to be called transportation intelligence. Drivers often had the best information on the road conditions, attitude of the local populations, locations of checkpoints, and our ability to get through.⁴²

If an intelligence requirement is the condition of roads required to convoy food to enclaves in Bosnia-Herzegovina, then truck drivers may be best able to provide the information. If special forces are the only forces living and eating among the local population, they may be the best sources to judge the attitudes of the local population. A good, common sense and yet "out-of-the-box" approach to the analysis of information sources always yields productive results.

Mission Creep

During peace operations, mandates, exit strategies, and end-states may change. These changes may be the result of slow, logical progress made by successful diplomatic efforts or they may result from a dangerous and sudden destabilization due to an unfortunate incident or diplomatic failure. The result is a change in mission called mission creep. Long duration or time is a feature of peace operations. Five of seven ongoing

observation missions have lasted five or more years. The same is true for three of four ongoing traditional peacekeeping missions.⁴³

Mission creep was a feature of operations in Somalia. The original UN Mission in Somalia, UNOSOM I, was primarily humanitarian. UN Security Council Resolution 751, 14 April 1992 allowed 50 UN observers to provide humanitarian aid and facilitate the end of hostilities in Somalia.⁴⁴ As food became a source of currency and clan power, the security situation worsened. The UN, on 3 December 1992, passed an additional resolution—UN Resolution 794. The United Task Force (UNITAF) was created and CENTCOM was tasked to lead a multinational coalition to,

secure air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and relief organization operations, and assist UN/NGO's in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices.⁴⁵

Under CENTCOM's leadership, UNITAF forces began to disarm the clans by confiscating crew served weapons mounted on small trucks or "technicals." Disarming the bandits and clans delayed but did not prevent the UN assuming the mission from CENTCOM on 4 May 1993. UNSCR 814, 26 March 1993, sanctioned UNOSOM II peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII—the first such mandate. Peacekeepers under U.S. Navy Admiral (Retired) Jonathan Howe and Turkish LTG Cevik Bir were tasked to disarm

clans, build a secure environment throughout the country, and in the process rehabilitate the economy and political system.⁴⁶ On 5 June 1993, 24 Pakistani soldiers were ambushed by Aideed supporters. The very next day, UNSCR 837 passed, seeking apprehension of those responsible. Fatefully, on 3 October 1993, 18 Americans were killed resulting from conditions related to the hunt for Aideed. President Clinton immediately eliminated all missions for U.S. forces except force protection then stated a plan for U.S. withdrawal.

There is no better example of the devastating effects of mission creep. Missions in Somalia changed and developed as the conditions changed. Recognizing this mission creep and identifying the changing list of those targeted for collection is the responsibility of the supporting intelligence structure. Other examples include the changing missions and functions in the former Yugoslavia, culminating in the bombings in Kosovo and, secondly, the eventual association of U.S. Marines with the Christian faction resulting in the devastating bombing in Beirut, Lebanon.

Mission creep or changing end-states can be most dangerous in situations where peacekeepers are in the midst of the local population while the fragile peace degenerates. A faction will eventually question the impartiality of peacekeepers, label them a rival supporter and subsequently target them for hostile

action. Changing end-states, changing objectives, and the impact of these changes on the perceptions of the local population must be carefully analyzed by intelligence personnel. Intelligence operations must create indications and warning processes and monitor these dangerous developments.

Cultural Considerations

In Somalia, Dr. Mark Walsh was employed as the UN Force Director for Kismayo, tasked with negotiating the return to normalcy in the south. He states that understanding the culture was fundamental to any success and that "misunderstanding the culture, could kill you."⁴⁷ Somalis were very intelligent, quick to manipulate any negotiation to their clan's advantage, clan-centric and xenophobic. Every event he relates emphasizes the point that western perceptions distort accurate analysis of Somali behavior—a critical understanding for intelligence personnel as they attempt to support their commanders tactically and diplomatically.

Arriving in Kismayo and tasked with organizing an impending visit for Admiral (Retired) Howe, Dr. Walsh visited Somali clans displaced from Kismayo by clans within Kismayo. His interpreter, a former national soccer player for Somalia, was from the clan responsible for the expulsion. His presence with Dr. Walsh was reason enough for their immediate execution.

Curiosity and Belgian military escort may be the only reasons they were allowed to live.⁴⁸ As the U.S. military began locating and employing anyone who could speak Somali, this clan heritage issue would have been critical in placing interpreters, recognizing collaborators, and judging the validity of low-level HUMINT collection information.

Dr. Walsh's anecdotes are rich examples of the absolute necessity of cultural awareness, strategically and tactically. In the first test of UNOSOM II, Dr. Walsh placed himself between an imminent battle between two major clans, one trusting Aideed's promise to retake Kismayo and return these displaced to their homes inside the city. In this one event, the cultural lessons justify a thesis, but two quick points need to be made. Dr. Walsh noted in the clans approach, the typical "march order"—women and children in front and the men, the fighters, scattered and hidden among the crowd—an important bit of tactical information that was very useful in strategies addressing crowd control. Secondly, in their approach, a Bantu settlement, located within the possible battle area was evacuated further away from Kismayo. Dr. Walsh eventually negotiated a standoff, avoiding a battle, and when attempting to return the Bantu to their camp, discovered that the clan outside Kismayo would not permit their return. Relief supplies supported the Bantu. The Somalis outside Kismayo helped

themselves to these supplies, now monetary currency, and intended to do so as long as the Bantu remained in their area.

Intelligence personnel came to understand that cultural understanding was the prism that had to be applied to properly view and understand any diplomatic, economic or military action in Somalia. In the Kismayo area, Dr. Walsh had to deal with 23 separate clans and sub-clans and without the consent of all, no negotiated issue or solution would stand. Clan rivalry was at the heart of every dispute. A people with so little, barely alive, would continue to fight and kill each other for nothing more than the continuing struggle to establish clan preeminence—a situation that was very difficult for Americans to comprehend.⁴⁹

One additional point to take from Dr. Walsh's experiences is the fact that diplomatic successes or failures of the day determined what was to happen tactically and locally the next day. The same was true in Mogadishu. Diplomatic progress determined which battles would be fought the next day. Therefore, it is no surprise that intelligence personnel must monitor diplomatic progress from two perspectives—that of the diplomats and that of the belligerents. Possibly, the most useful information to peace operations commanders is the determination that the attitudes of the people do not reflect those of the diplomatic negotiators. The result may include

explosive and unexpected violence among belligerents or directed at deployed peacekeepers.

Multinational and Combined Operations

Peace operations are multinational and combined operations. Designing the multinational force mix allows the UN some control over capabilities and, hopefully, the perceptions of impartiality and legitimacy held by the belligerents. There are times when the UN must employ the forces offered. Naturally, open sharing of information among the multinational forces is critical to success of all assigned missions. This open sharing is difficult for intelligence personnel.

As discussed earlier in a UN context, sharing intelligence information is essentially the same as declassifying that information. Sources and methods must be protected or they will be compromised. So how does one go about unifying intelligence operations in a multinational peace operations environment? The answer lies in three areas, establishing an intelligence unity of effort, intelligence liaison, and desourcing or sanitizing shared intelligence information.

Multinational intelligence operations are most easily developed if a single intelligence chief is designated and a multinational intelligence center created.⁵⁰ Collection plans should focus and capitalize on the capabilities of the

participating countries. Acceptably, participating countries may choose to operate and maintain their own restricted access intelligence centers, protecting sources and possible covert operations within the peace area of operations. If intelligence centers are in distinct locations, supporting sectors or zones of operations, liaison officers must be allowed and provided: The goal is a focused intelligence effort, supporting missions that eventually produce the declared end-state. The diplomatic end-state and force protection are two missions that multinational peacekeeping forces may have in common-missions that can help focus and unify intelligence operations.

If intelligence centers are located in distinct areas, liaison must be established between these intelligence operations. Note that this liaison is in addition to the liaison required to capitalize on information sources located along the "fault-line" (SOF, UNMOs, NGOs, GOs, military medical personnel, etc.) and other operations centers (HOCs and CMOCs). One last liaison consideration is the possibility that formal collective security organizations may be involved in any peace operation. NATO is deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and is now conducting operations in Kosovo; the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) may participate in any African peace operation. Liaison efforts must include the intelligence centers associated

with these collective-security organizations even if located out of area.

Sharing information may be difficult because of the sources of that information. Physical observation of ongoing operations or local collection is the place to begin multinational intelligence sharing. Passive, eyes-on-target systems or overt collection systems including observers, patrols, special operations forces activities, aircraft and low-level human intelligence operations provide an initial point to develop multinational intelligence operations. In the case of sensitive national sources, pursue tear-line-reporting techniques. Simply provide unsupported, unsourced statements of fact. Simple facts or event reporting provides information without disclosing sensitive sources and methods. This technique is sometimes called "tear-line reporting" as the information is separated from all sourcing information. This provides a way to share threat-warning information that may save multinational lives, not just U.S. lives, when national collections systems are employed and are sensitive sources. As trust develops, more sophisticated sharing arrangements may develop.

These multinational intelligence operations are not without problems. Language, lines of communication, collection capabilities, doctrine and dissemination automation vary widely among the countries deployed in peace operations. U.S. military

forces have their own dissemination problems within their intelligence system, making multinational dissemination orders of magnitude more difficult.

The inability to reliably disseminate intelligence, particularly imagery, within the theater was one of the major intelligence failures in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. One aspect of the problem was the lack of interoperable hardware....⁵¹

Dissemination is just one small, but critical part of the intelligence problem and providing common hardware may solve the problem for U.S. military forces. Interestingly, providing communications hardware (dissemination systems are primarily communications systems with appropriate software applications) to multinational peacekeepers does not mean they are capable of using the systems as intended. The Tofflers make the point in their book War and Anti-War, "Not every army in the world is culturally or politically (let along technologically) capable of using them (C3 systems)." ⁵² In some cultures, the free flow of ideas is not allowed and the synthesis of data into intelligence reports is designed to satisfy the wishes and opinions of political leadership rather than to present facts.

The bottom line is that multinational intelligence operations are very difficult operations with unique considerations. Not all information will be shared. Trust is initially absent. Collection, analysis and dissemination capabilities and doctrine vary widely. Cultural biases make

every step of the intelligence process difficult. Captain John H. Campbell writes of his experiences in Operation Joint Endeavor,

Not only did we have to establish guidelines for passing information, but we also had to learn to gather and assimilate intelligence from three very different international organizations: Italians, French and British. Eventually, we became an integral part of the Italians' intelligence collection plan. The Italians gave us access to their assessments of the current situation, including force protection issues. Translators were not available; occasionally, an allied soldier spoke some English, but in most instances neither party could communicate effectively.⁵³

Support to Information Operations

An increasingly important focus of effort in peace operations is information operations. In Bosnia, commanders have actively employed information operations to shape the population's understanding of missions, intentions, rules of engagement, and other topics of political importance. Lieutenant Colonels Garry Beavers, and Stephen Shanahan write that Major General Meigs analyzed and concluded that the Brcko Arbitration Decision, the resettlement of Doboj, municipal elections, enforcing law and order, and economic development were critical areas or "pressure points," to be supported by information operations.⁵⁴ MG Meigs then set about developing an IO Campaign to support his goals an objectives in these critical

areas. He employed a constant mix of press releases, psychological operations radio, handbills, press conferences (TV), and meetings with political leaders, public affairs radio to,

...shape audience behavior by influencing known pressure points, ... quickly respond to propaganda and disinformation, ... leverage the truth and stress peaceful cooperation, ... (and) hold public officials accountable for their actions.⁵⁵

This IO campaign, the first such comprehensive campaign, clearly required intelligence support. Traditional analysis of belligerent intentions and courses of actions must be understood and recognized, reemphasizing contacts with local factions or clans, civilians, political leaders (diplomatic efforts)—continued development of contacts along the fault line within the peace area of operations. The attitudes of the local population must be accurately understood. Measuring the effectiveness of the IO campaign—IO BDA—is, in essence, an accurate sampling the attitudes of the local population with regard to your specific messages.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Peace operations are a reality of today's political landscape. The absence of Soviet influence has allowed many states the freedom to deal with intrastate ethnic hatred and cultural repression with violence. The UN's attempt to

establish peace in these situations has led to a variety of peace operations, developing over time and including observation, traditional peacekeeping, 2nd generation peacekeeping and enforcement.

Characteristically, any given peace operation may dynamically range throughout the spectrum of peace operations. Peacekeepers find themselves operating as aid workers, teachers, escorts, policemen, jurists, diplomats, and warriors simultaneously, with their every move assigned strategic significance. They conduct these operations with military forces from other nations, nations that may be friendly to the U.S. and nations that are normally adversarial to the U.S. They also conduct these operations with non-military support agencies, diplomats and in the midst of the local population with no clear line drawn between adversaries. At times they are welcomed and at other times, violently and asymmetrically attacked by factions of the population that surrounds them. Their missions and objectives are designed to create a diplomatic end-state rather than a military victory.

In every case, intelligence is required. "Intelligence is as vital to the success of a peace operation as it is to any other military activity," states Kenneth Allard in his lessons learned from Somalia.⁵⁶ Intelligence operations supporting peace

operations are familiar and traditional while, at the same time, new and conducted in an unfamiliar environment.

Force protection, warning, assessing the capabilities and intentions of the belligerents, describing on-going activities are familiar intelligence functions. The very same intelligence functions conducted on a dynamically changing or ill-defined "enemy," surrounded by a population that at times is friendly and at times hostile and itself an enemy, is new. Strategic intelligence supporting diplomatic efforts is familiar. Tactical, operational and strategic intelligence supporting warfighters, now deployed as diplomats, is new. Culture can be ignored in war, overcome by firepower. In peace operations, an understanding of the effects of culture is critical to diplomatic as well as military success. Cultural understanding is also required for multinational coalition operations, part of the peace operations landscape. The consideration of adding these coalition partners to the intelligence collection list is new.

Just as peace operations are a reality, these unfamiliar features of intelligence support in peace operations are a reality. They must be documented, studied, trained, incorporated into doctrine, and made part of our military's intelligence culture. Tactics, techniques and procedures must be created. National-to-tactical collectors and analysts of all

disciplines must be capable of focusing on diplomatic and tactical requirements with equal precision from the peace area of operations. Methods of identifying indicators of changing end-states, mission creep, and ill-defined enemies must be determined. Multinational intelligence operations must be dissected and operating procedures developed. The same is true for new missions such as intelligence support to information operations.

Finally, the U.S. intelligence community must develop its approach to supporting the intelligence requirements of the United Nations. The UN is flirting with the creation of a strategic intelligence structure and the U.S. most certainly will play a prominent role in such a structure. With our world becoming increasingly connected, with national interests becoming secondary to global interests, it is high time to organize our information and intelligence structures with the flexibility to deal with the conditions of this new environment.

Word Count: 8400

ENDNOTES

¹President Franklin D. Roosevelt delivered these lines in a speech in Chicago, 5 October 1937, on the occasion of the Japanese invasion of China. Anthony Potter, producer, Japan Invades China, 51 min., Public Broadcasting Service, 1989, videocassette. (Japan Invades China is part 1 of 2 on the 51 min. videocassette. It is also part 1 of 16 in a PBS series entitled Between the Wars.)

²John Hillen, Blue Helmets, The Strategy of UN Military Operations (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1998), 21. The mission objectives have changed many times from 1948 until the present. These changes are specifically discussed on page 36.

³This is indirectly supported by editors Hans Binnendijk and David C. Gompert in their forward to the 1998 Strategic Assessment, Engaging Power for Peace (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), vii. While quoting conclusions from a previous edition, they say, "The most likely conflicts in the emerging system are the least dangerous to U.S. security," a point I will develop in a slightly different way.

⁴Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 28. Mr. Allard puts quotes around the term mission creep, as does Hillen, 147.

⁵William Jefferson Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 1998), 21.

⁶George F. Oliver, "United Nations Peacekeeping, The Dawn of a New Era," briefing, U.S. Mission to the UN, 22 September 1998, cited from a slide entitled, "UN Peacekeeping—Historical Perspective," cited with permission of Colonel Oliver.

⁷James M. Lose, "The National Intelligence Support Team," Studies in Intelligence 42, no. 1 (1998): 28.

⁸Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace 1995, (New York: Department of Public Information, 1995), 7.

⁹Ibid., 9.

¹⁰Robert H. Scales, Jr., America's Army: Preparing for Tomorrow's Security Challenges, Army Issue Paper No. 2, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998), 1-2.

Major General Scales also points out that globalization is an increasing characteristic that binds the interests of countries in ways not previously experienced.

¹¹Clinton, 1, 2, 5.

¹²Hillen, 17-18. Hillen makes the point that peace enforcement operations differ from observation, traditional and second-generation peacekeeping in that enforcement operations are not managed by the UN as demonstrated by the Korean and Gulf War conflicts.

¹³U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, Joint Publication 3-07.3 (Final Coordination), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 6 April 1998), I-7. Later in this same reference, separate chapters are dedicated peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

¹⁴Ibid., 19.

¹⁵For a good discussion on the oxymoron of consent in peace enforcement see, David Jablonsky and James S. McCallum, "Peace Implementation and the Concept of Induced Consent in Peace Operations," Parameters 29 (Spring 1999): 54-70.

¹⁶The referenced text concisely defines all peace operations terms in addition to peace enforcement. Most useful, however, is the included compact disk containing volumes of information related to peace operations—lessons learned, organizations, joint and service doctrine, articles, etc. U.S. Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Joint Warfighting Center, 16 June 1997), xiv.

¹⁷Michael Handel, "Intelligence and Deception," in Military Deception and Strategic Surprise, ed. John Gooch and Amos Perlmutter (New York: Frank Cass & Co., 1982), 141-142.

¹⁸Hillen, 21.

¹⁹Ibid., 23.

²⁰Ibid., 27.

²¹Ibid., 29-30.

²²Par Eriksson, "Intelligence and Peacekeeping Operations," in the CD-ROM, version 3, accompanying the, Joint Task Force

Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Joint Warfighting Center, 16 June 1997), 3.

²³Lose, 28.

²⁴Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, VII-6.

²⁵Hugh Smith, "Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping," Survival, (Autumn 94): 174.

²⁶Boutros-Ghali, 78-79. Specifically located in A/RES/47/120A, 18 Dec 1992. Also see Robert E. Rehbein Informing the Blue Helmets: The United States, UN Peacekeeping Operations, and the Role of Intelligence, (Kingston, Ontario, Canada: Centre for International Relations, Queens University, 1996), 23.

²⁷Smith, 185 and Rehbein, 23.

²⁸Oliver, Briefing 22 September 1998, Slide Entitled "Department of Peacekeeping Operations."

²⁹Smith, 179 and Rehbein, 30-32.

³⁰Karren E. Scott, "Paradigm Shift: U.S. Strategic Intelligence in the 1990's," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1993), 7-8.

³¹Smith, 175.

³²Ibid., 182.

³³George Tenet, "Support to Military Operations," briefing, Langley, VA, 5 March 1999, cited with permission of LTC Tim O'Neil.

³⁴Rehbein, 100.

³⁵Allard, 74.

³⁶Philip A. Odeen, Chairman, National Defense Panel, Honorable Richard L. Armitage, General (USMC Ret.) Richard D. Hearney, Admiral (USN Ret.) David E. Jeremiah, Honorable Robert M. Kimmitt, Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, General (USAF Ret.) James P. McCarthy, Dr. Janne E. Nolan and General (USA Ret.) Robert W. RisCassi, Transforming Defense, National Security in the 21st Century, Report of the National Defense Panel, December 1997, (Arlington, VA: National Defense Panel, 1997), 65.

³⁷Allard, 74.

³⁸Allard, 105-107.

³⁹Ibid., 67. Allard makes this point slightly less strongly.

⁴⁰Ibid., 66.

⁴¹Ibid., 69-70.

⁴²Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, III-9.

⁴³Hillen, 21, 27.

⁴⁴Allard, 14.

⁴⁵Ibid., 16.

⁴⁶Ibid., 18.

⁴⁷Dr. Mark Walsh, interview by author, 31 March 1999, Collins Hall, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, cited with permission of Dr. Walsh.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Dr. Mark Walsh, "Negotiating in Somalia," lecture, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, 17 February 1999, cited with permission of Dr. Walsh.

⁵⁰Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, VII-7.

⁵¹Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert SHIELD/STORM, report prepared by Warren L. Nelson, Archie D. Barrett, Robert S. Rangel and Christopher A. Williams, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., August 1993, 3.

⁵²Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War, Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), 146.

⁵³Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, VII-7.

⁵⁴LTC Garry J. Beavers, LTC (Ret) Stephen W. Shanahan, "LIWA Support to Operation Joint Endeavor/Operation Joint Guard, Operationalizing IO in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Course 4, Implementing National Military Strategy, III, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 19 November 1998), 23-23.

⁵⁵Ibid., 23-24.

⁵⁶Allard, 74.

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